Recent years have seen an intense and critical debate about the impact of microcredit on entrepreneurial activities and poor households welfare. This paper suggests that information asymmetries in the ex-post loan arrangement between the microfinance institution (MFI) and local borrowers could partially explain the limited impact of microcredit. The physical distance separating borrowers from the the MFI could be considered a proxy of the agency costs, making monitoring more costly and moral hazard easier. The estimation of the effect of distance on the borrower's self-assessed outcome of a microcredit project in Colombia is consistent with the presence of moral hazard in microcredit market, with agency costs decreasing with the geographical distance.
Introduction
Local financial development and the increase in the outreach of the provision of financial services are two relevant engines of growth and poverty reduction in Latin America and worldwide (Burgess and Pande, 2005; Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine, 2007; Levine, 2008; DemirgucKunt, Beck and Honohan, 2008; Arestis and Caner, 2009; Bittencourt, 2010) . Financial development, especially in developing economies, has been pursued through commercialization of bank services and through an intense process of liberalization and globalization of banking (Hanson, 2003; Cull and Martinez Peria, 2010) . However, commercial and foreign banks are not always able to reach micro-enterprises and the very poor, leaving a significant share of the population, often the most vulnerable ones, unbanked (Clarke et al., 2005; Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt, 2008; Beck and Martinez Peria, 2010; Stein, 2010) . This means depriving the poor from a wide range of opportunities, related, for instance, to their entrepreneurial talent, to access to education and to gender empowerment. The extraordinary development of microfinance and microcredit over the last decades, common to several countries, was generally evaluated as an extremely useful tool to fill this gap, providing access to some basic financial services to borrowers who traditionally can not have access to formal banking. However, the initial wave of enthusiasm over microcredit has been partially challenged by a set of new results obtained using randomized control trials, which suggest that "microcredit is not for every household, or even most households [. . . ] and it does not lead to the miraculous social transformation some proponents have claimed. But for some households it has precisely the types of impacts we would expect of a new source of credit" (Banerjee et al., 2010, p. 4) .
The limited impact of microcredit originated a passionate debate 1 . One potential explanation of a differentiated effect of microcredit has to do with some of the problems affecting traditional banking activities, such as the cost of monitoring and the ex-post moral hazard which are fueled by asymmetric information between the lender and the borrower. Traditionally, microcredit has been depicted as a very powerful tool to foster the build-up of trust (Feigenberg, Field and Pande, 2010) and to reduce informational asymmetries and transportation costs between lender and borrowers, thanks to several devices, ranging from group lending and peer-monitoring, to physical proximity and to embeddedness in the local community (see the extensive and critical review by Armendáriz and Morduch, 2010) .
In particular, joint liability group lending should stimulate "screening, monitoring and enforcement of contracts among borrowers, reducing or erasing the agency costs of the lender " (Hermes and Lensink, 2007, p. F2) . However, the importance of group lending has been recently questioned by Giné and Karlan (2009) , who are able to show that there is no change in repayment moving from group to individual liability. In absence of group lending, as it is the case for the program analyzed in this paper, individual loans might help deepen outreach, at the cost of maintaining the monitoring activity a prerogative of the lender. Thus, transaction and agency costs, which can be proxied by the physical distance between the bank and the borrower, remain a significant feature to explain the success of a microloan, as happens for traditional banking services. Moreover, personal information on individual creditworthiness can be collected at local level, putting the poorest at a disadvantage. Hence, repeated lender-borrower interactions will be necessary to collect sufficient soft information on clients to overcome informational asymmetries, making distance a more binding constraint at the beginning of the credit relationship.
In recent years the financial literature has seen a growing interest in the importance of distance in banking, as a proxy of transportation costs and informational asymmetries between lenders and borrowers (Alessandrini, Fratianni and Zazzaro, 2009) . The advantage of physical proximity is mirrored by the spatial diffusion of bank branches, which reduces the distance between the institution and local costumers. Since proximity entails a competitive advantage in terms of less costly searching and monitoring, banks can spatially discriminate their price setting (Calem and Nakamura, 1998; Degryse and Ongena, 2005) . At the same time, in several credit markets, both in developing and industrialized countries, the intense process of consolidation and the internationalization of the banking industry increased the functional distance between banks' decisional center and local economies, increasing the agency costs, with adverse consequences on firms' access to credit, especially for more informationally opaque SMEs (Mian, 2006; Zazzaro, 2009, 2010) .
The geographical outreach of MFIs, by contrast, has been less studied, mainly because of the general presumption that microcredit was able to be close to and embedded into local communities (Bateman and Chang, 2009 ). There is a growing but long-lasting concern that Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) are not able to reach the vulnerable poor (Amin, Rai and Topa, 2003) or the very poor (Hulme and Mosley, 1996; Coleman, 2006; Evaluation Cooperation Group, 2010) , also in Latin American countries, such as in Bolivia (Navajas et al., 2000) . Barriers to financial outreach in remote and rural areas generally include poor infrastructure, bad geography, the legal framework and low population density (Gulli and Berger, 1999; Group, 2006) . Hence, reaching poor costumers in the more marginalized areas of the country generally becomes not financially sustainable. The geographical distance separating the borrower from the bank, for instance, is negatively correlated with the likelihood of microcredit repayment in Nigeria (Oke, Adeyemo and Agbonlahor, 2007) -but not in Malaysia (Roslan and Karim, 2009 ) -and positively with interest rates, more intensive screening and more restrictive loan conditions in Niger (Pedrosa and Do, 2008) .
In this paper, we take advantage of a survey undertaken in Medellin, Colombia, on one hundred participants in an individual microcredit program (Banco de las Oportunidades -BoO) during 2005. Borrowers were asked to state the benefits they obtained from joining the microfinance program under several households and business aspects, such as their entrepreneurial activity and their income and housing conditions. Detailed information on the length of the credit relationship and on the distance separating the borrowers from the MFI are also collected. The paper's contribute to the microfinance literature is focused on the evaluation of the role of physical proximity in helping reducing the informational asymmetries and the agency costs which make the ex-post monitoring of individual microloans costly 2 . Similarly to several larger programs and in line with a worldwide trend which follows the acknowledgment of some pitfalls in the group liability lending (Giné and Karlan, 2009 ), this program is based on individual liability. Without joint liability, the local MFI can not take advantage of the group assortative matching and of the peer-monitoring process which should limit strategic default and ex-post moral hazard (Ghatak, 1999) . Therefore, differently from Pedrosa and Do (2008) , who focus on group liability lending, the aim of the paper is on individual lending to assess whether a lower distance separating borrowers from the lender contributes to overcome the traditional informational asymmetries faced by commercial banking, helping the program to reach its policy targets in terms of better living conditions and growth of new and existing businesses.
The hypothesis we want to test is that, given the individual nature of this microcredit program, the ex-post lender's monitoring activity and the recipient's moral hazard could depend on the proximity between bank and borrowers. On the lender side, physical proximity and low-cost repeated interactions make monitoring less expensive, reducing transaction costs. On the borrower side, an opportunistic behavior -i.e. choosing consumption over investment -is easier the greater the distance from the MFI, since the probability of being detected is lower. Diverting money from the agreed purposes will increase the likelihood of the termination of the credit relationship. This outcome is particularly costly for individuals who generally were unbanked before joining the program and whose informational opaqueness makes the evaluation of their creditworthiness extremely difficult. Hence, we expect that the outcome of the loan improves as long as the bank and the entrepreneur are closer.
Empirically, we will use several different information on the borrower-perceived outcome of the loan to construct four dummy variables related to the borrower's income and housing conditions, and on her firm's sales and number of employees. In this way, using a standard probit analysis, it is possible to assess whether a lower bank-borrower distance increases the perceives effectiveness of the micro-loan.
However, distance could be a proxy for other transaction costs. A long distance could increase transportation cost up to a point of making the visit to the bank a binding constraint for the entrepreneurial activity. To try to disentangle between these two effects, information versus transportation costs, we run an additional exercise in which we allow for a differentiated effect of distance according to the entrepreneur having obtained its first loan or being in a longer credit relationship. If distance is a proxy of the information asymmetries, it should becomes uninformative in explaining the success of the loan as long as the duration of the credit relationship increases, since the establishment of a credit relationship reduces information asymmetries (Diamond, 1991; Behr, Entzian and Guttler, 2011) , makes monitoring less expensive and reduces the hidden-action incentive for the recipient. By contrast, if distance captures transportation costs, its effect would be the same regardless the client being at her first loan or not.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. The next Section introduces the survey, in the context of the Colombian microcredit sector, and shows a descriptive analysis of its main aspects, focusing on the borrowers' relationship with the banking system. Section 3 undertakes the empirical analysis, aimed at assessing whether the MFI-borrower distance significantly affects the outcome of the loan. Finally, Section 4 discusses some policy implications to design effective tools to expand bank outreach.
A descriptive analysis of the microcredit program

Microcredit in Colombia and the Banco de las Oportunidades
According to the Inter-American Development Bank, in Colombia in 2005 there were 22 MFIs, serving more than 600,000 borrowers (Navajas and Tejerina, 2006) . It was a traditional market, dominated by the Banco Caja Social Colombia with almost 500,000 borrowers 3 , and less developed than the ones in many other Latin-American countries. The number of microfinance clients over population was 1.3%, much less than in Perù (4.2%), Bolivia (5.9%) and Nicaragua (7%); even scaled by microenterprises, the number of MFI borrowers (7%) is below the regional average (8.7%).
The microcredit program object of this study has been established as part of a wider public program named Plan de Desarrollo de Medellín, aimed at promoting the development of Medellin and at improving the socio-economic conditions of its citizens. Within this framework, microcredit is conceived as one of the instrument of a wider social and economic assistance program, involving various public and private institutions. Therefore, the structure of the project foresees the Municipality of Medellin as the main sponsor of the program and involves a microfinance project -the Banco de las Oportunidades, a local microfinance institution -the NGO Microempresa de Antioquia, which offers both credit and training services, and two other supporting agencies. Basically, the credit activities of BoO are actually run by Microempresa de Antioquia, which works upon donors funds 4 .
Description of the survey
The interviewed participants are randomly selected from the Banco's dataset of approved credit lines and stratified by economic activity and town districts. Participants were asked to state the benefits they obtained from joining the microfinance program under several aspects, such as their main business activity, living conditions, housing and land ownership. In particular, the questionnaire adopted to conduct the interviews contains nine sections covering different aspects of the clients' business as well as their relation with the microfinance institution 5 . The scope is to undertake a multidimensional assessment analyzing the performance of the programs under different aspects.
The first one is the capacity to target the relevant population, in other words to really address poor people facing credits constraints in financing their business activity. Also, it is important to ascertain whether the program is sufficiently flexible to comply with their needs. In most of the cases, the success of a microfinance project is determined by the presence and the quality of the related services provided to clients such as training, legal assistance, etc.
The second aspect is the economic impact of the program. Once defined the population, it is necessary assessing the capacity of the program to improve the living conditions of the clients. This part is more complicated than the previous one as it is not sufficient asking the respondents their perception. Various elements indeed (e.g. misperception of cost and benefits, fear of retaliation) could bias the personal judgment of the beneficiaries on the program. At this scope, the literature on impact evaluation in general uses counterfactual analysis and, more recently, randomized control trials (Banerjee et al., 2010; Karlan and Zinman, 2009 ). Due to time and funds constraints, this project has not been able to interview a control group of respondents with the same characteristics of the beneficiaries in the two samples. This implies that from a purely quantitative point of view, the analysis cannot conclude that an economic improvement of the respondents is fully attributable to their participation to the program. Nevertheless, the survey data can still serve the purpose of this paper, which is the assessment of the role of distance on the intensity of the borrower-lender informational asymmetries. In other words, even lacking a control group, it is possible to evaluate whether the repeated interaction between the MFI and the borrower and a shorter distance between the two, making the monitoring activity less expensive, increase the recipient's perceived impact of the loan.
4 Still now, the Banco de las Oportunidades is a policy of the National Government of Colombia whose main objective is to promote access to credit and other financial services to the unbanked Colombian population, specially to the low-income families, micro and medium-sized enterprises and entrepreneurs. This program is part of the long-term policy of the National Government of Colombia to reduce poverty, promote social equity and stimulate economic development in Colombia.
5 For a more detailed description of the survey and the questionnaire, see Molini and Rabellotti (2008) .
Descriptive analysis
Individual and firm characteristics
The survey is based on 100 Banco de las Oportunidades borrowers, interviewed during the summer of 2005, with a prevalence of women (56%) and with a mean age of 40 years; men are, on average, almost six years older (44 versus 38 years, the difference being statistically significant). The average borrower's household is made by 4 people, with only 15 borrowers living in households with only one or two people. Even if the literacy rate is 92 percent, the level of education is quite heterogeneous: 19 borrowers have no formal education, while 36 completed the primary education and the others achieved a secondary or tertiary level of education. As regards the entrepreneurial activity, 78 business-owner were already entrepreneur before joining the program and half of the sample is made by individual firms, with just 9 businesses having more than two employees. Two third of borrowers owned already their business in 2002, when the Banco de los Pobres (the original name of BoO) was established, while few respondents have started a brand new firm after the credit approval (Table 1) . Hence, the entrepreneurs have, on average, more than ten years of experience in their sector of activity, in line with the project guidelines, which suggest to target microcredit towards entrepreneurs with a long lasting experience in the sector. Firms' activity is concentrated in the retail trade (30 entrepreneurs, mainly men) and the textile and clothing (21 firms, mainly women-owned) sectors. From the bottom panel of Table 1 emerges, not surprisingly, that the relationship between microentrepreneurs and the financial system is rather weak. This is not surprising in a country like Colombia where the percentage of adult population with access to an account with a financial intermediary in those years was just 41% (Demirguc-Kunt, Beck and Honohan, 2008) . In the same period, high inflation and economic and political instability determined an increase in interest rates and banks demanded for valuable assets as collateral. Therefore, only individuals providing strong guarantees are eligible to receive loans, while those with limited assets are generally excluded by the formal credit market. Figure 1 shows the evolution of the ratio between private credit by the financial system over GDP in South-American countries and confirms the relative poor performance of the Colombian banking sector in the first years of the new millennium. Our sample appears to be fully representative of this situation and suggest that the Banco de las Oportunidades microcredit program has been effectively targeted to the unbanked. Only 36 borrowers have a credit relationship with another financial institutions and, out of these, 10 individuals use credit instruments and 24 are interested in saving instruments. This actually suggests that current borrowers have very limited exit options, so that the cost of investment choices which will limit access to microcredit from borrowers is particularly high. In fact, as a provider of microcredit, the BoO program is not the exclusive solution for all borrowers, but only 13 individuals participate at other (public or private) program. Besides, only 17 borrowers demanded credit from other financial institutions before joining the program: 10 did not receive credit, while 5 got a loan, even if at more restrictive (quantity or price) conditions. By contrast, current borrowers who did not ask for bank credit before joining the program were mainly impaired by high interest rates and lack of requisites, such as collateral, further confirming the good capability of the microcredit program to reach people with a limited access to banking services. Finally, the Banco de los Pobres program has been able to present itself as an attractive one, especially thanks to lower interest rates, rather than taking advantage of a lack of information on microcredit, since two third of borrowers have information on other microcredit programs.
Credit relationship characteristics
A specific section of the questionnaire has been devoted to analyze the characteristics of the credit relationship. Since there is a great equality among men and women with regard to the amount, the conditions and the length of the loan, Table 2 presents some statistic for the whole sample of respondents. At the time of the interview, the average borrower was part of the program from 20 months: ten borrowers enrolled in the program since its inception, while 30% are recent costumers (less than one year). The length of loans ranges between 1 to 3 years, with the most common loan lasting 24 months. Given the short history of the microcredit program, borrowers have not yet built a long credit history: 42 of them, when interviewed, were reimbursing their second loan, while just two were at their third loan. In sum, there are information on 144 loans, 54 of which are already concluded. All borrowers declared to pay an interest rate of 0.91% in real terms on a monthly base for an individual loan, repaying back every month from 4 to 5 percent of the principal. Notwithstanding the low interest rate, at least compared to the ones offered by commercial banks, 27 loans show problems related to the reimbursement, mainly the accumulation of arrears. Loan size ranges between 150,000 and 3,000,000 pesos, with the average amount being around 2.3 million pesos, which correspond to about 1,000 dollars. Given an average per capita income of 3.17 million pesos in 2005, it means that the average loan, smoothed over a two years period, corresponds to about 40 percent of the annual per capita income. Therefore, the amount disbursed is small and probably not sufficient to accumulate any relevant amount of capital. Accordingly, the program seems to be more oriented at alleviating the liquidity constraints faced by loan recipients rather than being an instrument to promote investments. Nevertheless, even if loans are very small, some respondents have invested in new tools and machineries. According to the survey, 65 respondents have bought raw materials and other inputs, 43 machineries or tools (8 borrowers used their loans to acquire both inputs and machineries or tools).
For what concern the interaction between the MFI and the borrower, there is a common pattern for the frequency of the visit to the institution, which happens once a month for almost all (97%) borrowers. However, there is a much greater variations in terms of time spent to reach the MFI. For many borrowers (40%), the institutions is less than 15 minutes away from home, but one third of costumers spend more than half an hour to go the MFI.
Finally, given the importance that non-credit programs have on the success of microcredit (McKernan, 2002) (but partially challenged by Karlan and Valdivia (2011) ), great emphasis has been given by the program to the provision of additional services, such as free training activities and technical assistance. Recipients have shown a great appreciation for the additional services provided within the program: 94 individuals have taken advantage of the training services and 79 have declared that this has been extremely useful to improve the management of their business activity. A useful insight, for instance, in this direction is a relevant increase in the use of accountancy systems, as a clear effect of the diffused training activity in this area.
Microcredit effect
Not having the possibility to run a counterfactual analysis with a sample of non-borrowers, the survey collects and combines various information regarding clients' satisfaction with the microfinance project, the potential income variation and the capital/working-capital variation. The interviewed were asked whether they saw some improvements in their well being and whether, according to them, this was directly attributable to the participation to the program 6 . Asked in which area they have mainly observed improvements, respondents have indicated the scale of their activity, a better access to technology and a better product.
Four detailed sections of the questionnaire check and deepen the analysis of the self-assessment of the program, asking direct questions on some measurable indicators to inspect the relationship between the program and some improvements in the well-being of the beneficiaries. In fact the direct self-assessment provided by the respondents may be biased by several reasons, such as the misperception of the benefits or the willingness of not criticizing the program, fearing some form of retaliation.
To assess the way in which costumers perceive the economic impact of the program we consider several alternative indicators 7 , which will constitute the dependent variables of the empirical exercise carried out in Section 3:
1. a dummy equal to one if the variation in monthly income inside the household since the loan is positive (Income);
2. a dummy equal to one for positive changes in total sales since the loan (Sales);
3. a dummy equal to one whether the number of workers increased since the loan (Workers) 8 ; and 4. a dummy equal to one if there was a change in the house (i.e. its value, the contract, availability of services) after the loan (Housing). Notes: All variables are dummies equal to one for positive variations and to zero for negative or no changes in the measured outcome since the start of the loan.
On the whole, from the survey emerges a positive picture: three borrowers out of four declare that their household income and/or their business sales increased after the loan. Specifically, the 6 This is a way to control for other elements independent from the access to credit that might have conditioned a positive or negative performance. We have combined the two answers and found that almost all the respondents who have answered positively, have indeed attributed their improvement to the credit concession.
7 Given that in informal economies measuring income is very complicated, the validity of the following indicators is checked comparing the income and sales figures with respondents' characteristics and assets in order to verify the consistency of their answers. We expect -and verify -that every interviewee declaring an income increase also registers a positive variation in her assets, an expansion of her business or, finally, the acquisition of new working tools and/or an increase in the working capital/working tools (Molini and Rabellotti, 2008) .
8 For all these three variables, the original question asked for positive, negative or no change; The latter two options have been aggregated to create three dichotomous variables.
improvements in income and sales are more likely to materialize the longer the credit relationship: two thirds of borrowers state that their household income or firm's sales increased in the first year, while this percentage is close to 90% in the third year. One third of the recipients were also able to improve their housing conditions and to hire more workers. Even in this case, benefits occur more likely in the second and third year of the credit relationship. The differentiated impact of the program under different outcomes has to do with the the stickiness of the decisions to hire and to invest in housing. By contrast, sales and income react promptly to an increase in the enterprise's success 9 .
Given that the sample is made by individual businesses or micro-enterprises, it is not surprising to observe that almost all the individuals whose income increased in the post-loan period, contemporaneously experienced an acceleration in total sales. Just four people mentioning a higher income lament a negative or no variation in sales and the other way round. By contrast, a higher household income is translated in better housing conditions just in the 35% of cases (7 individuals invested in housing improvements even in absence of an increase in income), and the 40% of entrepreneur experiencing a boost in sales chose to hire more employees (in 4 cases, the number of workers increased even without a sales' increase).
3 The effect of distance in loan outcomes
The model
Since the aim of the empirical analysis is to estimate the impact of geographical distance on the self-assessed success of the loan, the dependent variables are the four dummies introduced in Section 2.3.3. Therefore, the empirical model is the following: P r(Ooutcome) = Φ(Distance, Relationship Length, Controls)
where Outcome is, alternatively, Income, Sales, Workers and Housing. Distance is the traveling distance (in hours) between the borrower and the MFI. Relationship Length is the duration (in months) of the credit relationship and controls for the possibility that the realization of the outcome requires time since the loan disbursement, a stylized fact discussed in section 2.3.3. Controls is a set of control variables including individual gender, age and years of schooling, the number of household members, the number of employees in the firm, and two dummies identifying former entrepreneur and first-time borrowers (from the MFI).
Equation 1 is estimated by a probit estimator, with robust standard errors. To inspect the possibility that the impact of distance on informational asymmetries could vanish with the duration of the credit relationship, in an augmented specification of equation 1, the distance variable is inserted separately for first-time borrowers and for recipients at their second or third loan, assuming that the number of loans is a good proxy of the bank-borrower relationship intensity (Behr, Entzian and Guttler, 2011) . Finally, the robustness of the main findings is tested changing the set of control variables, including the dummies for sector of activity, for previously rejected borrowers, for individuals with outstanding arrears, and for individuals borrowing from other banks, which should take into account individual riskiness and the possibility of winner's curse outcome (Shaffer, 1998) 10 .
The effect of distance and relationship lending on the perceived outcome
The results of the estimation of equation 1, reported in Tables 4 and 5 , show that, on the whole, some firm and individual characteristics matter for the outcome of the loan. While age and gender are not significantly associated with a change in income, sales or living conditions, more educated borrowers are more likely to translate the microloan into an actual increase in income and sales 11 . Costumers coming from larger households are more likely to attribute to the loan a positive change in housing and family income, while not in firm-level outcomes, suggesting that family size matters only for personal outcomes. Firm size, instead, has a positive effect on the change in the number of workers, in sales and in household income, but not in housing: individuals running larger micro-enterprises seems more able to take advantage of microcredit. Consistently with the mission of the program to provide credit to the unbanked and to support the growth of new businesses, positive variations in household income and firm size (but not in housing) are more likely to happen for new entrepreneur. Notes: The table reports the average partial effects (APEs) and, in brackets, the associated robust standard errors. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The model is estimated using Stata 11 SE package with PROBIT and MARGINS commands.
Moving to the two key credit variables, the duration of the credit relationship has generally a positive marginal effect on the loan outcome, consistent with the descriptive evidence suggesting that actual changes in output need time to unfold. Besides, this result could be conforming with a learning by doing process in microcredit, according to which subsequent loans can be more effective thanks to a better capacity of the bank to fulfill borrower's needs and to a better investment effort by the recipient.
Looking at the effect of physical proximity, the coefficients on the distance separating the borrower from the MFI is always negative and statistically significant, with the exception of the Income model. This result suggests that the transaction costs in monitoring still matters for individual microloans. The more severe the asymmetric information on the actual use of the money lent, the greater might be the temptation for the recipient to pursue other targets, such as favoring consumption over investment and, therefore, showing a lower probability of a positive loan outcome.
The effect of geographical distance, however, is limited to the first loan (Table 5 ) and, in that case, it turns significant also for the probability of a positive change in household income. This differentiated effect of distance further confirms the presence of asymmetric information between lender and borrowers. As long as the latter build her credit history through successive loan applications, in fact, the availability of soft information makes monitoring less costly, while the opportunity cost -the future lack of access to microcredit -of the diverting money from the original purpose of the loan will increase, given the limited borrower's outside options. 
The table reports the average partial effects (APEs) and, in brackets, the associated robust standard errors. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The model is estimated using Stata 11 SE package with PROBIT and MARGINS commands.
To quantify the economic impact of the credit variable on the perceived success of the loan, the diagrams reported in Figures 2 and 3 show the estimated likelihood of a positive change in business sales (left hand side panels) and of an improvement in housing conditions (right hand side panels) as a function of the length of the MFI-entrepreneur relationship and of the physical distance between the two agents. Considering the latter, the estimated probability of a positive variation in sales is higher than 80 percent a long as the MFI is less than 20 minutes away from the borrowers (it is higher than 90% for individuals very close to the MFI), while it decreases to 53 percent for individuals living one hour away from the microfinance office. A similar picture emerges considering the improvement in housing conditions: the probability of a positive change in housing decreases from 40 to 14 percent as the borrowers moves from 10 to 45 minutes away from the MFI (Figure 2) .
The size of the effect of the duration of the credit relationship is quite similar. Individuals at their first months with the MFI show a probability of a positive variation in sales of 50 percent, while after one, two and three years this probability increases to 70, 85 and 95 percent, respectively. A similar picture emerges considering the housing conditions: the probability of observing an improvement in housing increases from 20 to 35 percent comparing individuals borrowing from one and two years from the MFI (Figure 3 ). Table 4 (columns 2 and 4). All the control variables included in the model are taken at their sample mean.
A growing strand of research in banking literature is stressing the role of distance as a barrier to access to credit and as a proxy for informational asymmetries between borrowers and lenders. As regards the effectiveness of microcredit to reach the poor and fulfill their financing needs, great emphasis has been given to bad geography, poor infrastructure and low population density, all features which increase the transportation costs and limit bank outreach. Recent experiences, in fact, goes into this direction exploiting new technologies and innovations in order to increase the physical proximity to the unbanked. By contrast, a limited attention has been devoted to the effect that the bank-borrower geographical distance has on the flow of information during the loan. A notable exception is the recent work by Pedrosa and Do (2008) , who focus on individual lending extended by a MFI in Niger finding that greater distance is correlated with more restrictive access to credit. This analysis, instead, is about the role of distance in individual liability loans. If, on the one hand, individual loans could help increase microcredit outreach, on the other hand, the removal of the joint liability brings the monitoring and enforcement of the loan contract bank to the lender. As a result, more in individual than in group liability lending, the problem of moral hazard should be more pressing as long as the distance increases, with adverse consequences on the outcome of the loan.
Data on a sample of urban borrowers from a Colombian microcredit program allow for testing whether ex-post informational asymmetries, proxied by the bank-borrower distance, matter for the effectiveness of microloans in fostering household wellbeing and business sales. Since the time required to reach the MFI is a significant determinant of the effect of the microloan on the entrepreneurial activity and living conditions, we could interpret this as an indication that the spatial diffusion is a critical aspect to be considered also in microcredit. A further confirmation that geographical distance actually measures agency and not transportation costs comes from the fact that distance matters exclusively for the first loan. In subsequent loans, indeed, distance is not correlated with the outcome of the loan, consistently with a reduced problem of moral hazard, thanks to the MFI better knowledge of the recipient and to a limited incentive for the borrower to divert money from productive use.
The evidence provided by this paper -which is consistent with the existing literature on this topic -can be particularly relevant in a period of intense discussion about the future of microcredit and of a move towards commercialization in order to increase bank outreach. While reaching the unbanked, still estimated at 2.5 billion people in 2009 (Chala et al., 2009) , is a critical policy target to fight poverty and inequality, the instruments to undertake such a goal are not well defined. Notwithstanding the caveat related to the absence of a counter-factual and to the data limited to an urban experience in Colombia, two strong implications of the analysis are that agency costs are important in individual lending and that geographical distance matters for the effectiveness of the loan.
Future strategies to expand bank outreach should take into account that moral hazard is a critical issue and that physical proximity could contribute to attenuate it. However, subsequent analysis are necessary to deepen the role of distance in microcredit along several lines, in order to draw more sensible policy guidance. The first one would focus on alternative settings and especially on rural ones, where low population density and poor transportation can make distance a more binding constraint. A further extension of this kind of analysis might focus on the role of distance on repayment rates and on interest rates applied by the MFIs.
